Throughout the world, there is debate about how democratic systems should adapt to the demands of their increasingly emancipated citizenries. More than ever, people desire to take part in the creation of their life circumstances.
with some incidental remarks to other countries. The debate may provide food for thought outside Germany about how to cope there with the democratic crisis.
B. Fundamental Pre-Requirements for Representative Democracy
Before considering specific measures of reform, it is necessary to highlight some fundamentals. What are the conditions for a successful representative democracy? Traditionally, constitutional lawyers in Germany consider it sufficient that the exercise of public authority can be traced back to the electorate along a Legitimationskette (a chain of legitimacy). 16 But this conventional legal perspective, which sees citizens merely as voters, is too narrow. Successful democratic government depends on the complex interplay of more elaborate conditions. These conditions can be summarized as "responsiveness" and "political leadership" on the part of elected representatives, and "participation" and "acceptance" on the part of the represented.
I. Responsiveness and Political Leadership by the Representatives
Political scientists-mainly influenced by American scholars-generally agree that elected representatives ought to be responsive to the wishes of the citizens. 17 From the legal perspective, however, responsiveness as a requirement is far from taken for granted. A superficial reading of the Basic Law-as of other constitutions-could lead one to think that elections are sufficient. Parliamentary delegates are constitutionally granted a free mandate; they are "responsible only to their own conscience." 18 Still, representative democracy is far more than a matter of such formalities. True government by the people requires some substantive guidance for those forming the public will. Attempts to provide such guidance by binding elected representatives to the Gemeinwohl will hardly prove sufficient, since the "common good"-in modern words, "output-legitimation" 19 -is always subject to dispute in individual cases. Before we can say that "all state authority is derived from the people," the wishes of those represented must be reflected more closely in political decisions and the processes leading up to them. 20 We must also see as indispensable what political science refers to as political leadership. 21 Even promoters of an "active society," like Amitai Etzioni, 22 have to admit that absolute responsivity is not possible. The range of preferences is too contradictory, the problems are too complex, and the need for decisions-often intensified by time pressure-is too great. In addition, there is the necessity to take account of unarticulated interests for sound solutions to societal problems. Ultimately, elected politicians must personally make decisions as "trustees," not only on behalf of their respective supporters and electorate, but rather of the "entire people," 23 regardless of whether the decisions correspond to the concerns of the electorate or not. 24 Democracy is more than mere "demoscopy," or democratic opinion polling. Edmund Burke long ago scathingly warned against mere "populism." "Your representative," he said, "owes you not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." 25 How should political representatives resolve the challenging tension between responsiveness and political leadership? The traditional-rather paternalistic-German response is that they should strive for the well-being of the people as opposed to the people's will. 26 The idea is, in the words of Ernst Fraenkel, that the "hypothetical will of the people" (hypothetischer Volkswille) in cases of doubt should prevail over the "empirical 19 will" (empirischer Volkswille). 27 From the standpoint of the public, however, the relationship between rule and exception is precisely the other way round. Reasoned justification is required if parliamentary delegates depart from express public wishes. As the American political scholar Hanna F. Pitkin puts it: "The representative system must . . . be responsive to public opinion, except insofar as non-responsiveness can be justified in terms of the public interest."
28 This idea can also be found as a fundamental value within the German constitution. If all state authority is to be "derived from the people," 29 the guiding principle must be: As much responsiveness as possible, as much political leadership as necessary. Departures from public demands have to be justified through argument.
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II. Participation and-Albeit Critical-Acceptance by the Represented
The success of democracy is not solely the responsibility of the elected representatives. The represented public must also make its contribution. What is needed is-following the concept of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba-a "civic culture," a Bürgerkultur, characterized by a propensity of the citizens towards political participation on the one hand and an-albeit critical-degree of acceptance on the other hand.
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Participation is more than a matter of merely taking part in elections. Contrary to what constitutional law implies on its surface, elections are only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. Joseph Schumpeter stated once that as soon as the citizens have elected someone, they have to concede that political activity is the delegate's responsibility rather than their own. 32 This view can, of course, not satisfy contemporary needs. It brings to mind Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famous sentence that "[t]he people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of 27 28 PITKIN, supra note 17, at 224. See also DAHL, supra note 14, at 69 (arguing against a paternalistic "guardianship" in respect to the "common good").
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 20(II)
. 30 See PITKIN, supra note 17, at 209 ("The representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interests."). members of parliament. As soon as they are elected; slavery overtakes it." 33 To ensure that "all state authority is derived from the people," 34 the citizens must also be able to exert influence on the parliamentary decision-making processes. This can be a matter of acting individually, in concert with other citizens, or by means of intermediary institutions. 35 In the first place, it is the task of political parties to respond to interests in society, to aggregate interests in practicable alternatives, and to bring them forward in the parliamentary decision-making process. 36 Parties have no monopoly in this, but rather merely "participate in the formation of the political will of the people."
37 From the viewpoint of constitutional law, the citizen's influence on parliamentary policy-making is guaranteed by fundamental rights of communication (Kommunikationsgrundrechte) like free speech, the right to assembly, and so on, which provide for an unrestricted debate within society. By noting that these guarantees are "fundamental for a free democratic state order" ("für die freiheitlich-demokratische Staatsordnung schlechthin konstituierend"), the German Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly clarified that the political role of the public reaches far beyond the casting of votes.
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Participation requires sufficient information about-and interest in-the issues at hand.
39
Casting one's ballot-while being rather easy to accomplish-has hardly any specific influence. 40 40 See LUHMANN, supra note 12, at 166 (stating that not participating at elections may be rational against this background).
cost to the activist. It requires a greater degree of commitment, conflicting with other interests. From all sides of the political spectrum, complaints about the decline of traditional political engagement in political parties can be heard, but according to empirical studies, around two-thirds of German citizens would be willing to play an active role in society. 41 The social capital, to use Robert D. Putnam's term, 42 is still remarkable in Germany. The fact that this willingness to be engaged hardly ever involves contributing to the representative democratic processes should be understood as a wake-up call, requiring parliamentarians to strengthen their efforts to include the people in their decision-making.
If representatives make decisions, which in the context of their task of political leadership depart from citizen preferences, then the propensity of the people towards acceptance becomes critical. Rather than blind obedience, a functioning democracy requires healthy skepticism on the part of the public. Citizens are the "principals." They need to control their "agents." The people must effectively be able to express dissent. 43 This is, in the words of Niklas Luhmann, necessary to secure the "general recognition" that is independent of the "gratification derived from an individual decision," 44 and this depends above all on the perceived legitimacy of the underlying procedures. "Legitimation by procedure" (Legitimation durch Verfahren) is decisive. 45 Legitimacy is primarily a matter of selecting political representatives. The electoral process must be so structured that voters exert a significant and evenly distributed potential for influence on the composition of parliament. Beyond this, however, the form of parliamentary decision-making process is important. The democratic process of deliberation 46 may not be restricted to politicians, but rather should involve the public equally and to the greatest possible extent in the free and transparent opinion-forming process. 47 The German Federal Constitutional Court once ruled that the constitution pictures the relationship between the citizens and the executive branch of government as one of dialogue. 48 Why should the same not apply to the polity's relationship with its parliament?
Furthermore, citizens will more likely accept controversial decisions when parliament ensures transparency. Parliament has to show that it functions in the sense of responsiveness. It has to make clear that what citizens think-and possibly has been communicated to the representatives-has been weighed in a fair way and that the parliamentary majority cannot be exercised free from controls. 49 Ultimately, parliamentary decisions must be reasoned and explained to the citizen. It is not enough to rely merely on pointing out that the "chain of legitimation" proceeds from elections. It is also insufficient if parliamentarians only refer to the fact that there are no alternatives. And that "hard power"-the sheer exercise of the coercive resources of the state authority-can only be the last resort should be a matter of course in democratic societies.
50 "Transformational leadership" is necessary.
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III. Improvement of Democracy as a Constitutional Requirement
Including perspectives of political science in the debate about constitutional law traditionally faces reservation in German legal scholarship. 52 The aforementioned requirements for the success of representative democracy, however, are not only a matter of political prudence. Constitutions provide norms only in the form of indispensable rules 47 Cf. 44 BVERFGE 125 (139) 50 NYE, supra note 21 (differentiating between "hard," "soft," and a mixture from both -"smart power"). 51 See BURNS, supra note 21. 52 See, e.g., SEBASTIAN UNGER, DAS VERFASSUNGSPRINZIP DER DEMOKRATIE 86, 247 (2008).
for the democratic order.
53 It is the constitutional task of the parliament and individuallyelected representatives to reach over and above these minimum constitutional standards, in such a way that public decisions enjoy the highest possible level of legitimation (Legitimationsniveau). 54 Over the last few decades, we have witnessed an obvious shift of values-a Wertewandel-among the population. 55 Past generations showed a significantly stronger tendency to dutifully accept unpopular decisions. In today's society, citizens are less trusting. People desire more than ever to take part in the creation of their life circumstances. Against this background, it is important to enhance the influence of the citizen, not only on the composition of the representative political bodies, but also on parliamentary decision-making, to improve the transparency of political procedures. This would simultaneously strengthen the responsiveness of the elected representatives and ultimately contribute to the public being more ready to accept political leadership that conflicts with their own perceptions. This article will subsequently illustrate recommendations for concrete steps with a view on the federal level in Germany.
C. Reforming the Electoral Process
What can electoral law contribute to the success of representative democracy? For a long time, this question was hardly raised in Germany. Germans opted for the proportional representation in the Bundestag, the Federal Parliament. There are, however, some modifications. On the one hand, half of the parliamentary seats are awarded by majority vote in electoral districts. On the other hand, every party needs to pass a threshold of five percent of the overall votes in order to be awarded any seats at all. For decades, there was broad satisfaction with this electoral system; it was even admired and praised abroad 56 53 See KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS (20th ed. 1999) (stressing the notion of norms only as indispensible rules). 54 Questions of the appropriate "Legitimationsniveau" are discussed in Germany so far only in respect to the democratic legitimation of the administration but not in respect to the legislature. See, e.g., 83 BVERFGE 60 (72) and was the role model, for example, for the election law in Scotland, Wales, and New Zealand. 57 In the meantime, critical voices may be heard in Germany.
I. Introduction of a Majority Voting System?
Today, there are calls for a complete conversion to majority voting, 58 similar to the system in place in Great Britain. 59 The fact that majority voting-at least generally-enables effective political leadership through stable governments 60 is an increasingly strong argument in Germany in the face of its increasingly fragmented spectrum of political parties. In addition, the unfortunate circumstance could be recognized that, despite previous coalition statements, with proportional voting, the electorate can never be sure which government they are voting for. The fact that small parties frequently have disproportionate leverage is particularly annoying to many in Germany. It may be expected that elected representatives under a majority voting system direct their "focus of representation" 61 less toward their party and more towards the citizens, since the voters have a greater influence on their entry into parliament. 62 Naturally, an argument against the majority voting system is the fact that this system-as also increasingly criticized in Great Britain 63 -disadvantages those citizens who wish to vote for smaller parties. Some think that this amounts in effect to a de facto minimum requirement for entry into parliament of twenty or even forty percent in Germany. 64 This is the decisive objection from a constitutional viewpoint. 65 Parliament should reflect the full range of political currents, even if this renders political leadership more difficult. 66 In any case, the change of system could hardly be achieved in Germany politically even through a grand coalition (Große Koalition) of the major parties. The traditional mass parties-the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)-are increasingly less attractive to the voters. 67 Suspicion would be inescapable, as citizens would speculate that they sought to make themselves winners instead of losers.
II. Reform of the Present Electoral System
Supplementing the Five Percent Minimum Requirement by a Supplementary Vote
This is not to say that there is no room for improvement. There are increasing demands for the abolition, or at least reduction, of the five percent minimum requirement clause, to increase public participation and parliamentary responsiveness. 68 Courts have declared this restriction to be unconstitutional for municipal elections. 69 For the election of the EU Parliament, the Federal Constitutional Court recently decided that even a three percent limitation clause was void. 70 For the elections of the Bundestag and the parliaments on the State (Länder) level, however, the need for majorities, which are capable of providing effective and efficient political leadership, still justifies the restriction of "equal weighting" of votes.
71 Examples of new groups establishing themselves in parliament are shown by the development of the ecologist party Die Grünen, the leftist party Die Linke, and recently, but only on the Länder (State) level, the Piratenpartei.
Obviously, if the party chosen gains less than five percent of the total votes cast, citizens may think they have wasted their vote. This frustration can be counteracted, however.
Citizen should be given a Nebenstimme (a supplementary vote) that is counted if the main vote is unsuccessful because of the five percent restriction. 72 The electorate could then initially vote for the party that most closely reflects their interests, without the worry that they may squander their potential to exert influence. This reform would improve the electoral chances of the smaller parties and thereby broaden the range of interest represented in the German parliament. Transferable votes are already common in many countries with majority voting systems. 73 
Personalizing the Party Lists, Official Announcement of "Protest Votes," and Preliminary Elections
That the German electorate has too narrow a choice in elections is another serious complaint. Some discussion exists concerning a "pretend participation" and a "cosmetic effect" of the franchises. 74 Some even compare the situation to the "quasi elections in the German Democratic Republic." 75 In fact, there are always candidates entering parliament by means of the party lists who have stood for election in a constituency but were not directly elected by the citizens. 76 While this possibility should not be seen as a violation of the constitutional guarantee of "direct" elections as required by Article 38(I) GG, 77 the severe restrictive effects of the rigid party lists on voter influence must be taken seriously. At the same time, it has to be noted, though, that the fact that the parties create lists for elections also has its advantages. On the one hand, the frequently criticized Ochsentourthe cumbersome yearlong party career, which candidates usually have to complete before being appointed-should not be underestimated as a preliminary qualification for the parliamentary mandate. On the other hand, parties gain the ability to ensure a balanced representation by listing candidates from underrepresented social groups.
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A reform option would consist in opening the party lists to the voters. At the moment, in federal elections, citizens can basically only choose between party lists. It would be better if each voter had several votes that could be distributed between several candidates on the list or be cumulated on one candidate. 79 This reform would maintain the responsibility of the parties to nominate candidates, but at the same time strengthen voter influence on the composition of parliament. This would augment the responsive efforts of delegates towards the citizens, the independence of politicians from their parties, and the propensity for political leadership. Furthermore, the electorate should be able to express its dissatisfaction with the established parties, without having to deface its ballot papers, cast invalid ballot papers, opt for extremist parties, or even stay away from the polling station. This can be achieved through the official announcement of blank ballot papers-in France these are termed "votes blancs"-or through separate "protest votes." 80 Parties' nomination procedures can also improve. In Germany, party delegates regularly nominate electoral candidates, not the party members directly. 81 To increase the opportunities for participation-and also to facilitate citizens freshly entering into politics-the legislature should demand direct preliminary elections of the party candidates (Vorwahlen). 82 parties in Germany should allow as sufficient a party registration instead of a formal party membership. Such a "party membership light" would be attractive for those citizens who wish to participate in nominating candidates, but-at least initially-have no interest in the further activities of the party. Preliminary elections would enhance the public's knowledge, particularly about the constituency candidates. Unfortunately and astonishingly, these candidates are often unfamiliar to the electorate up to now. 84 Public "duels" would counteract this. To this extent, one should not be shy of "Americanizing" politics. Entirely open primaries should, however, be avoided in Germany as these would give the opponent too great a scope for manipulation. 
Extension of the Governmental Period, But No Bundling of the Election Dates
The closer elections get, the more difficult politicians find it to exercise political leadership by making unpopular decisions. For this reason, scholars debate an extension of the electoral period of the Bundestag from four years to five. 86 Other countries-for example, Austria-have already implemented this reform. Restricting the citizen's opportunities to participate in this way seems acceptable if other democratic reforms are implemented in return by extending opportunities for the people to participate in parliamentary decision-making. 87 Some scholars currently also consider combining the Länder elections with the federal parliamentary election or coordinating state elections, for example in the middle of the federal election period. 88 This would significantly relieve the burden; however, a legal obligation to bundle all electoral dates would contradict the constitutional law principle of federal state autonomy guaranteed above all by Articles 20(I) and 28(II) GG. 
III. Extending the Franchise
Finally, scholars in Germany debate whether the franchise should be extended to further groups of potential voters. Some call for a franchise at birth, a Wahlrecht von Geburt an, which-initially exercised by parents on a trustee basis-should ensure child-friendly politics. 90 This, however, would lead in effect to a multiple franchise of parents, which is legally impermissible in Germany even through a constitutional amendment, as it would constitute a departure from the equal value of votes. 91 To kindle interest in democracy among the young, it makes sense to reduce the voting age to sixteen, as has happened in Austria. 92 This would be a fruitful challenge for parliamentary candidates, parents, schools, and other institutions. 93 The eligibility to stand for election, however, should-as with Austria 94 -be limited to those who have reached the age of majority. This is because an appreciation of the political mandate of elected representatives-in particular the challenge of weighing between responsiveness and political leadership-requires a particularly high sense of responsibility. Apart from this, foreign citizens who have lived in Germany for several years, work there, and pay taxes should receive the franchise through a facilitated path to citizenship. 95 "No taxation without representation" holds today as it did at the time of the American Revolution. 
I. Disclosure and Regulation of the Influence Exerted by Lobbyists
The first step is to disclose and regulate the influence of lobbyists. In Germany, people consider the silent power 97 of those representing specific interests a danger for the democratic principle of equality, a restriction on the transparency of parliamentary decision-making, and a threat to the public acceptance of controversial decisions. Without question, representing interests-whether those of the common well-being or simply of private benefit-is part of democracy just as much as free elections and independent media. 98 Fair and pluralistic competition, however, requires that the representatives of specific interests work in a transparent way and have equal opportunities of access. Here, we see-especially when compared with the U.S. fairness towards competitors, and the waiver of influence gained by financial or other substantive material incentives. 106 Criminality is a matter for public prosecution.
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Transparency of the External Influence and of Committee Deliberations
To secure public acceptance of controversial decisions, the external influence of interest representatives on individual decisions should be more transparent. Admittedly, documenting each and every legislative footprint is impractical. 108 To realize the constitutional requirement of transparency, however, parliament should lay down that all expressed external positions on legislative proposals should be centrally documented on the website of the Bundestag. 109 In addition, it should be required that legislative drafts of the ministries are published as soon as they are made available to specific interest groups involved in the decision-making process. Unfortunately-and bewilderingly-this is not always the case in Germany up to now. 110 More transparency is also needed in the parliamentary decision-making process itself. While the German constitution requires that "sittings of the Bundestag shall be public," 111 parliamentary committees generally meet behind closed doors. This gives rise to public mistrust because parliamentary decisions are de facto made in these committees. 112 Cases exist where a privileged area free from public disclosure is necessary for the creation of opinions. Parliamentary procedure law, however, should require that this is not the rule, but an exception requiring a reasoned justification. Admittedly, this proposal goes against the present formalistic conventional view on German constitutional law, but it is in line with the leading constitutional principle of parliamentary publicity.
profession would be unconstitutional, however. Nevertheless, a regulation would be admissible and reasonable whereby-following the American model 121 -former politicians would not be able to act as lobbyists within the following legislative period.
II. Strengthening the Influence of Individual Members of the Public
Second, one must consider the influence of individual citizens on parliamentary activity. Increasingly, citizens are no longer satisfied with the role of spectators after the election. 122 There is a considerable political interest-only twenty-two percent have no or only a limited interest 123 -which can improve the responsivity of parliament and render controversial decisions more acceptable.
Petition Procedures, Ombudsman Functions, Peoples' Initiatives
The starting point in Germany is the constitutional right of petition. 124 Important reforms have already been implemented in recent years. Petitions of general interest (von allgemeinem Interesse) are open to the public online. In addition, provided 50,000 citizens support a submission, the Petitionsausschuss (the Petition Committee) must deliberate with the petitioners openly rather than behind closed doors. 125 This form of participation should be improved through a petition management system, which discloses the respective stage of the submissions being pushed forward. 126 From a political perspective, there is a serious complaint that the Petition Committee of the Bundestag has only a subordinate role in parliamentary activity. 127 An ombudsman could render public concerns more visible. 128 There are role models especially in Scandinavian countries. In Germany, however, the treatment of petitions is traditionally organized within the parliamentary system 129 and this should remain so. Ombudsman functions should be exercised not by an independent person, but by the chair of the Petition Committee. Political differences of opinion in the treatment of petitions in the committee must be disclosed in detail. So far, the committee only provides a general overview.
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The possibilities for public influence should be strengthened by means of allowing a certain number of individuals to legally oblige parliament to deliberate on a particular concern. 131 Such Volksinitiativen (peoples' initiatives) would serve the desire of the public for more direct democratic involvement without restricting the representation principle. Peoples' initiatives need not be a preliminary step to a Volksentscheid (a legally binding peoples' decision) but may be deployed as independent participatory instruments. 132 If the parliamentarians make a decision that does not correspond with the articulated public interest, they have to face popular frustration in the next election at the latest. This is the price of political leadership.
Exerting Influence on Legislative Procedure
The general legislative procedure itself also contains possibilities for strengthened participation. In individual cases, the Bundestag already offers discussion forums on the Internet. 133 To strengthen the equality of possibilities for influence-and ultimately also to enhance the public acceptance of decisions made through political leadership-the individual member of the public should have an enforceable right to express opinions on legislative proposals. 134 The Swiss Vernehmlassungverfahren could serve as a model. 135 As expression of opinion rather than decision is concerned, the information and participation opportunities can be limited to the Internet-to reduce the parliamentary workload and involvement-although the possibilities to use this method are not yet uniformly distributed in the society. The parliamentarians will have to take account of the digital divide in their decision-making and also remember that the opinions expressed may be distorted by fraudulent activities such as intentional mass mailing. In addition to this, consultative referenda (Volksbefragung) should be considered by parliament. 136 Experiences on the local level and abroad support this proposal. 137 
Using Empirical Research Methods
In all forms of public involvement, parliamentarians have to take into account that wellresourced and educated groups of the population use the opportunities to participate disproportionately often. In the words of Elmer Eric Schattschneider: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." 138 This threatens the democratic demand for equality. For the political representatives, it is difficult to correctly assess the balance of interest. There is a danger that parliamentary responsiveness will be distorted. To counteract this threat, the expertise of social sciences in empirical research should be considered by the Bundestag. In Germany, the experience has been far from negative on the local and regional level with a "citizen forum" (Bürgerforum) and "citizen statements" (Bürgergutachten). 139 Such measures can render parliamentary work more fertile. Some consider giving even decision-making rightspossibly in the form of a veto-to discussion groups in which randomly selected members of the public participate. 140 This would, however, contradict the constitutionally required chain of legitimacy. Therefore, this idea cannot be realized in Germany.
III. Role of the Representatives in Parliamentary Decision-Making
Finally, consideration should be given to the way in which parliamentarians can take account of the preferences of the public in the interest of responsiveness in the decision-making process, and how they are able to implement their assessment on the need for political leadership.
Division of Labor Between Plenary and Committees, Parliamentary Minority Rights
Many complain that the Bundestag's plenary debates generally have no effect on policy outcomes, since the opinions of the parliamentary groups are formed in advance. 141 Division of labor between plenum and committees, however, is necessary. In a comparative perspective, there is a rule of thumb, according to which the more time a parliament spends in plenary debate, the less influential it is. 142 This does not mean that what is previously discussed and decided in parliamentary committees is merely given a form of legal validity in plenum. 143 Rather, the plenary debate is intended to justify the respective political position publicly. The debates not only provide information for future elections, but they can also contribute to the acceptance of controversial decisions, because in the parliamentary debates the people sees that what they think-and possibly have submitted to parliamentarians-plays a role in parliament in the sense of responsiveness. This aspect should not be underestimated. Also, speeches of partyindependent parliamentarians and of those who depart from the party line contribute to the success of representative democracy, particularly when the government is supported by a grand parliamentary coalition or if governing parties and large parts of the opposition are of the same opinion.
Contrary to the traditional image of the separation of powers, parliament in the German system-as also in Great Britain-generally fails as a "veto player" 144 in the legislative process, as the parliamentary majority regularly supports the government. 145 Therefore, the political minority above all has the task to control its government. 146 As many citizens fail to understand this intra-institutional separation of powers, 147 an express provision should be included in the Basic Law that emphasizes the task of the opposition to control. 148 Parliamentary minority rights, such as the right to publicly question the government and to set up a committee of enquiry, can already be used by opposition parties to mobilize the public and exert pressure on the government. 149 The political "knockabout" in parliament-at times sanctimoniously criticized, even by politicians themselves 150 -is not a symbol of degeneration but rather the expression of a fertile Streitkultur, a fruitful arguing culture. Democracy means a fight for the well-being of the people in an "agonistic pluralism"
151 and parliament provides an appropriate arena for this. In this context, the trend to political entertainment-for example, in talk shows-is not to be bemoaned but praised as a sign for a vivid democracy. 152 
Decision-Making Within the Party Factions
The widespread criticism of the power of the party factions in parliament (Fraktionen) carries more weight. There is talk of the parliamentary mandate becoming "depersonalized." The complaint is that individual delegates have only a minimal potential to effectively influence the decision-making of parliament. 153 Still, it is an important task of party factions to aggregate the various ideas and concerns of the parliamentarians. 154 The public has elected the parliamentarians also-if not even primarily-as representatives of a particular political party in Germany. Against this background, there is no constitutional objection against Fraktionsdisziplin, the social pressure being exerted in the party factions. In Germany, only Fraktionszwang-downright faction compulsion-is prohibited. 155 Apart from that, it is politically and legally correct that delegates generally appear not as struggling alone but as voluntary members of a team. The situation is different for the formation of faction policy. The elected representatives of the people are not merely organizational and technical intermediaries between their party and parliament. 156 Within their factions, parliamentarians are called upon to be responsive to public preferences and to express themselves according to their consciences and with courage regarding their own views on the need for political leadership. The clarification of problems should not always take place behind closed doors. 157 The public will not be offended by open internal debates. They only expect that compromises are upheld.
E. Final Remarks: More Government with the People
The empirical findings mentioned at the outset of this article have made it clear: The democracy of the twenty-first century cannot only be the one, which was founded in Germany after the collapse of the Third Reich in 1949. The well-known triad of Abraham Lincoln-"government of the people, by the people, and for the people" 158 -must be extended in Germany as elsewhere towards more "government with the people." This article has contemplated what can be done in Germany de lege ferenda to increase the influence of the public on the composition of parliament and parliamentary decision-making and to improve the transparency of the procedures. Euphoria is out of place here. Even if parliament and the delegates exploit all opportunities for the improvement of the level of legitimacy, public acceptance of political leadership decisions that do not reflect its own interests and values will remain precarious. Still, the more representative democracy transparently involves the public, the more hope for acceptance of their decisions without having to deploy coercive state power.
Finally, there are worrying sociological findings regarding "unequal democracy." 159 The lower a person's level of education and income is, the less likely he or she is to participate in elections. 160 Many of the proposed reforms are subject to the criticism that they further
